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ENLARGED PANELS IN THE  
COURT OF APPEAL OF SINGAPORE 
For many years the Court of Appeal of Singapore generally 
sat with no more than three judges to hear cases. Since 2014, 
however, quintets have increasingly been constituted in that 
court. This article considers the recent practice in Singapore 
and, drawing on comparisons with the position in some 
other Commonwealth jurisdictions, offers a few thoughts on 
its possible operation in the future. 
LAU Kwan Ho 
LLB (National University of Singapore), LLM (New York University); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management 
University. 
I. Introduction 
1 The Court of Appeal sits literally and figuratively at the apex of 
the Singapore judiciary. It feeds on a varied diet of cases. Its constitution 
is a healthy mix of permanent members – the Chief Justice, the Vice 
President, the judges of appeal – and other High Court judges who sit 
ad hoc at the Chief Justice’s request. Litigants before that court often see 
two or three austere faces bearing down on them – or at least, that was 
so until recently. Now they increasingly have to field questions from an 
attacking quintet. The five-judge panel has made its return in the Court 
of Appeal. 
2 Singapore, separating from Malaysia, became an independent 
republic in 1965. By a historical oddity its judiciary did not dissociate 
fully from the Malaysian court system until 1970. That was when the 
Court of Appeal and the Court of Criminal Appeal were established, in 
place of the Federal Court, as the topmost judicial tribunals in 
Singapore. In July 1993 the two courts were merged into a single Court 
of Appeal with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. All this while, one 
thing did not change. It was that but a maximum of three judges would 
sit to hear the case. Often it would be a trio, possibly a duo where the 
case related to some interlocutory or procedural matter. 
3 A peculiar event then occurred in August 1993. A five-judge 
panel of the Court of Appeal was convened to decide a criminal appeal.1 
                                                          
1 Mok Swee Kok v Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 134. 
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By all accounts, it was the first time the court (by whatever name called) 
had constituted itself in a quintet since the founding of the nation. 
Scarcely had the reverberations settled when another criminal matter, 
this time a reference on certain questions of law, reached the Court of 
Appeal; again, it sat five strong to hear the case.2 This marked the second 
time a full hand of judges decided a matter in that court. 
4 Nearly two decades would pass without another quinary Court 
of Appeal being convened in Singapore. In January 2014, Sundaresh 
Menon CJ indicated that that court would freshly explore the prospect 
of constituting five-judge panels for selected cases of jurisprudential 
significance, so that difficult or unsettled issues which arose were 
resolved with the benefit of the collective wisdom and insight of a larger 
pool of judges.3 Within two months an expanded five-member court 
would be convened to hear a criminal appeal.4 Since then, 34 other 
written decisions have been issued by a jumbo Court of Appeal, as at the 
end of 2018. The present article first provides a short background of the 
expanded court in common law systems, followed by an analysis of the 
cases in Singapore with a view to ascertaining some trends in the 
summoning of an expanded panel here. Observations are then offered as 
regards the possible operation and further refinement of the Singapore 
practice in future cases, in the light of the experiences of other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
II. Background 
5 Apex courts in the common law world typically arrange 
themselves into one of two models in the disposal of cases. The first is 
the en banc court, where cases are ordinarily heard and decided by all of 
the permanent members appointed to that court. The New Zealand 
Supreme Court and the US Supreme Court are examples of this. The 
                                                          
2 Public Prosecutor v Tan Meng Khin [1995] 2 SLR(R) 420. 
3 Sundaresh Menon, “Response by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon” Opening of the 
Legal Year 2014, Singapore (3 January 2014) at para 31. See also Sundaresh Menon, 
“Foreword” in David Llewelyn, Ng Hui Ming & Nicole Oh Xuan Yuan, Cases, 
Materials and Commentary on Singapore Intellectual Property Law (Academy 
Publishing, 2018) at p v. As for the uncommon expansion of the High Court to 
hear certain appeals made thereto, Judith Prakash JA wrote in TUC v TUD [2017] 
4 SLR 1360 at [3] and [12] that this would be justified where the case required the 
court to give its fullest possible consideration to novel or important legal issues 
requiring detailed examination. Such a procedure was generally approved by the 
Court of Appeal in Chew Eng Han v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 1130  
at [47]–[48]. See also Lau Kwan Ho, “The High Court as De Facto Court of Appeal: 
A Revisitation of Leave Requirements in the Criminal and Family Court 
Jurisdictions” [2019] SingJLS (forthcoming). 
4 Muhammad Ridzuan bin Md Ali v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 721. 
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second model is the court which sits generally in panels, each of which 
is composed of a subset of the court’s total permanent membership. The 
top courts in Singapore, Australia, Canada and the UK utilise this 
model. 
6 To these default positions there exist a variety of exceptions. 
Most will be discussed here by way of overview only, with the remainder 
of this article to focus on one particular exceptional situation. 
7 For a court that sits en banc, one exception is that it need not 
always sit with the full complement of judges. While the usual practice 
in the US Supreme Court is for all nine justices to sit to hear cases, the 
quorum for the court to be duly constituted is six justices.5 It is rare but 
not unheard of for that court to sit in a panel smaller than nine; the 
common instances are where a permanent justice has to recuse himself 
or herself, or has retired or passed away, and leaves a temporary vacancy 
in the court. 
8 A second exception is that even a court in the en banc tradition 
may not always sit with a permanent membership. The quorum in the 
New Zealand Supreme Court is five judges.6 Currently only five 
permanent judges have been appointed. Occasionally, one or more of 
them cannot hear a case owing to recusal or other circumstances. The 
solution in New Zealand is that any temporary gap will be filled by 
acting judges (who are retired Supreme Court or Court of Appeal 
judges) functioning in a supernumerary role.7 
9 Another exception, one that potentially applies to both models, 
is that a reduced number of judges can decide on limited categories of 
matter. These include leave to appeal applications, appeals against 
interim, interlocutory or ancillary orders and the making of case 
management orders. An efficient allocation of judicial resources is 
usually cited as the reason for having them heard and decided by a 
smaller number of judges. The temptation to label these as 
non-substantive matters should be resisted given that they may have 
very real effects on the disposal of any given case; it might be better to 
                                                          
5 28 USC § 1 (US); Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, r 4.2. 
6 Supreme Court Act 2003 (2003 No 53) (NZ) s 27(1). 
7 Supreme Court Act 2003 (2003 No 53) (NZ) s 23. Notably, a former judge of the 
Supreme Court did not believe this arrangement to work well primarily because 
there might not be enough of such retired judges and they were not necessarily 
keeping up with changes in the law: Peter Blanchard, “The Supreme Court – 
A Judge’s View”, speech at the University of Auckland Conference on the 
New Zealand Supreme Court, Auckland (14 November 2014). Criticism had also 
been levelled by Michael Taggart in “Acting Judges and the Supreme Court of 
New Zealand” (2008) 14 Canterbury L Rev 217. 
© 2019 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 
910 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2019) 31 SAcLJ 
 
classify them imperfectly as proceedings of an ancillary, interim or 
interlocutory nature. 
10 The last exception covered here, and which is observed only in 
those courts which do not sit en banc, is that the usual size of the panel 
may be enlarged on a suitable occasion. Any expansion is subject to 
contrary legislation – a common limitation is that there must still be an 
odd number of judges – but after that it is usually left to the court itself 
whether to puff up, so to speak, for the hearing and disposal of specific 
cases. It is this particular scenario with which the present article is 
concerned. 
III. Trends 
11 Certainly there is no doubt in Singapore that a sitting Court of 
Appeal may under legislation expand to five or more members. The 
chief authorising provision is s 30(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature 
Act,8 which reads: 
The civil and criminal jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal shall be 
exercised by 3 or any greater uneven number of Judges of Appeal. 
Paragraph 85A of the Supreme Court Practice Directions then returns a 
discretion to the Court of Appeal itself to determine, as and when 
appropriate, whether to convene a panel of five or any greater uneven 
number of judges. Yet other provisions and instruments are germane in 
setting out the Chief Justice’s discretion to constitute an expanded 
court.9 (A third formulation exists but that applies only in a choice 
between a two- or three-judge panel for the hearing of certain specified 
interlocutory or non-final appeals and applications; here it is the first 
instance judge or a Judge of Appeal who should resolve any confusion or 
uncertainty as to the appropriate size of the panel.)10 The convening of 
an enlarged panel being therefore a judicial practice, it would be useful 
in the first instance to understand how the Singapore judiciary perceives 
its utility. 
                                                          
8 Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed. 
9 For criminal matters, see ss 386(2), 386(4)(b), 394I(5)–394I(7), 395(14) and 396(4) 
of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed); s 34(4) of the Organised 
Crime Act 2015 (Act 26 of 2015); and regs 11(2) and 11(4)(b) of the Organised 
Crime Regulations 2016 (S 236/2016). For civil matters in the Singapore 
International Commercial Court, see O 110 r 53(2) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, 
R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) and para 24(3) of the Singapore International Commercial 
Court Practice Directions (effective 1 November 2018). 
10 Paragraphs 85(2)–85(4) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions (2006 Ed), read 
with s 30(2) of, and para 3 of the Sixth Schedule to, the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed). 
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12 The clearest expression has been the statement of Menon CJ in 
January 2014 cited above. It appears to be a guide and the words should 
not be read strictly like a statutory directive. They mention three criteria 
against which a case might be evaluated for appropriateness of hearing 
by an enlarged court: jurisprudential significance, difficulty and 
unsettledness. It is not told immediately whether the first criterion 
(which can appear to be an umbrella category) overlaps wholly or in 
part with the second or third, or if it can form a separate category of 
cases on its own – for example, a case might not raise particularly 
difficult or unsettled issues but could conceivably be of legal 
significance, such as where the court is asked to construe a newly 
enacted statute of relatively broad application. Each category is also 
capable of individual application without reference to the other 
categories, but conversely this should not perhaps automatically 
discount the case in which partial elements of the various criteria are all 
present to make it an appropriate one for hearing by a fuller court. 
13 In similar vein but with comparatively more detail are the 
guides published by the UK Supreme Court, the High Court of Australia 
and the New Zealand Court of Appeal regarding the convocation of 
enlarged panels. In the UK, five criteria have been specified: (a) if the 
court is being asked to depart, or may decide to depart, from a previous 
decision; (b) a case of high constitutional importance; (c) a case of great 
public importance; (d) a case where there is conflict between decisions 
in the Privy Council, the House of Lords and/or the Supreme Court; and 
(e) a case raising an important point in relation to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms11 (“ECHR”).12 In Australia, the categories are not dissimilar, 
namely, those cases: (a) which involve interpreting the federal 
constitution; (b) where the court may be invited to depart from one of 
its previous decisions; or (c) where the court considers the principle of 
                                                          
11 Eur TS No 5, 213 UNTS 221, 1953 UKTS No 71 (4 November 1950; entry into 
force 3 September 1953). 
12 Available at https://www.supremecourt.uk/procedures/panel-numbers-criteria.
html (accessed March 2019). The current President of the court has further 
indicated that at least seven will sit if the court is being asked to depart from a 
previous decision of the House of Lords or the Supreme Court, and that nine will 
sit if the court has to reconcile conflicting decisions at that or Privy Council level: 
Baroness Hale of Richmond, “Should the Law Lords Have Left the House of 
Lords?” Michael Ryle Lecture 2018, London (14 November 2018). See generally 
Chris Hanretty, “Optimal Panel Size on the UK Supreme Court” (17 February 
2016) <http://acle.uva.nl/binaries/content/assets/subsites/amsterdam-center-for-law-
-economics/conferences/celse-2016/conference-papers/session-ii/paper-hanrety---
2016.pdf> (accessed March 2019); James Lee, “Against All Odds: Numbers Sitting 
in the UK Supreme Court and Really, Really Important Cases” in Apex Courts and 
the Common Law (Paul Daly ed) (University of Toronto Press, 2019). 
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law involved to be one of major public importance.13 For New Zealand, 
the main criteria are where: (a) the establishment or revision of 
sentencing guidelines is proposed; or (b) the appeal involves issues of 
evidence, procedure or practice of general application or some other 
issue which will be of major significance to other cases, particularly 
where there is no right to apply to the New Zealand Supreme Court for 
leave to appeal.14 
14 It will be seen that the New Zealand criteria are more specific, 
whereas the UK and Australian positions overlap in some areas with the 
criteria in Singapore but are wider: they include cases that are of great 
public importance or raise an important point relating to the ECHR 
(which cases, at least on a facial reading of the criteria, need not be 
jurisprudentially significant or raise difficult or unsettled issues). Now 
there is no similar rights convention in the Singapore context, but one 
would not be surprised if the stated criteria here were subsequently 
refined to mention also those cases the resolution of which would have 
great public importance – it will be seen later that a few of the decided 
cases can probably be said to already fall into that bracket. 
A. Preliminary observations 
15 From 2014 to 2018, 35 written decisions were issued by a 
five-judge Court of Appeal in Singapore. Some preliminary observations 
on them can be made. First, the cases warranting review by an expanded 
court have arisen in both the civil and criminal arenas. Seven of the 
35 decisions were criminal matters, of which one was on criminal breach 
of trust;15 one was on rape and sexual assault;16 two were on the subject 
of drug trafficking;17 and three were in connection with a conviction of 
murder.18 This count is undoubtedly inflated by the Kho Jabing line of 
cases, where one offender managed to exercise the same curial quintet 
on three different occasions. 
16 As to the civil cases, these are quite a mixed bunch. Two have 
been in the admiralty jurisdiction,19 three concerned companies 
                                                          
13 Available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/about/operation-of-the-high-court (accessed 
March 2019). 
14 Available at https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/the-courts/court-of-appeal/cases-to-
court (accessed March 2019). 
15 Public Prosecutor v Lam Leng Hung [2018] 1 SLR 659. 
16 Pram Nair v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 1015. 
17 Muhammad Ridzuan bin Md Ali v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 721; Abdul 
Kahar bin Othman v Public Prosecutor [2018] 2 SLR 1394. 
18 Public Prosecutor v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112; Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor 
[2016] 3 SLR 135; Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 1259. 
19 The STX Mumbai [2015] 5 SLR 1; The Chem Orchid [2016] 2 SLR 50. 
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legislation,20 three dealt with intellectual property,21 two were on family 
law,22 one on the doctrine of res judicata,23 one on the conflict of laws,24 
one on land law,25 one related to commercial arbitration,26 two were on 
investment arbitration,27 two on constitutional adjudication,28 five on 
contract law29 and five on tort.30 It is fair to say that the expansionary 
practice has been put to use across a variety of subjects. 
17 To put these figures in context, the 35 decisions constitute about 
9.8% of all the written decisions issued by the Singapore Court of 
Appeal from 2014 to 2018. (This excludes the court’s decisions made on 
appeal from the Singapore International Commercial Court, of which 
more will be discussed later.)31 It is an incomplete but useful proxy for 
the percentage of cases which are heard by a five-judge panel: 
incomplete because the Court of Appeal sometimes rules in a case 
without issuing a written decision (in such a scenario it is almost always 
a dismissal of the appeal after the hearing), but useful nevertheless given 
the absence of detailed and globalised official figures. And if one peers 
still more closely at the civil-criminal divide, then using the same 
methodology it is roughly 9.9% of the written civil decisions and 9.3% of 
the written criminal decisions that have been issued by an expanded 
court during the same period. Although the sample size cannot of 
necessity be a large one, it appears preliminarily that there is virtually no 
                                                          
20 Ting Shwu Ping v Scanone Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 95; SK Engineering & Construction 
Co Ltd v Conchubar Aromatics Ltd [2017] 2 SLR 898; Diablo Fortune Inc v Duncan, 
Cameron Lindsay [2018] 2 SLR 129. 
21 Société des Produits Nestlé SA v Petra Foods Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 35; Global Yellow 
Pages Ltd v Promedia Directories Pte Ltd [2017] 2 SLR 185; Warner-Lambert Co 
LLC v Novartis (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2017] 2 SLR 707. 
22 TMO v TMP [2017] 1 SLR 585; UDA v UDB [2018] 1 SLR 1015. 
23 The Royal Bank of Scotland NV v TT International Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 1104. 
24 Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2018] 
2 SLR 1271. 
25 Chan Lung Kien v Chan Shwe Ching [2018] 2 SLR 84. 
26 L Capital Jones Ltd v Maniach Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 312. 
27 Sanum Investments Ltd v Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
[2016] 5 SLR 536; Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v Kingdom of Lesotho 
[2019] 1 SLR 263. 
28 Kho Jabing v Attorney-General [2016] 3 SLR 1273; Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-
General [2017] 2 SLR 850. 
29 PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd v Airtrust (Hong Kong) Ltd [2017] 2 SLR 129; 
Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui [2018] 1 SLR 363; Turf Club Auto Emporium 
Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 2 SLR 655; Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v 
Yeo Boong Hua [2019] 1 SLR 214; BOM v BOK [2019] 1 SLR 349. 
30 Goh Lay Khim v Isabel Redrup Agency Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 546; ACB v Thomson 
Medical Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 918; Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien 
[2017] 2 SLR 492; Ng Huat Seng v Munib Mohammad Madni [2017] 2 SLR 1074; 
Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 
[2018] 2 SLR 866. 
31 See para 31 below. 
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difference in the rate of five-judge panels being convened between civil 
and criminal cases. 
18 If we focus on the annualised figures, a clear year-on-year 
increase is generally observed. The following table contains for the 
calendar years 2014 to 2018 the written decisions issued in a five-judge 
court as a rounded-off percentage of all the Singapore Court of Appeal’s 
written decisions in the relevant period.32 
Year Percentage of all written decisions 
2014 1.6% 
2015 4.3% 
2016 10.1% 
2017 17.1% 
2018 14.1% 
19 Another notable aspect is the level of consensus seen in the five-
judge Court of Appeal. Save for two decisions,33 all of the 35 cases were 
disposed of unanimously with a solitary judgment. And those judges 
who wrote separately in the two outliers were in broad agreement with 
the majority’s analysis of the law. Overall, this combined rate of dissent 
and concurrence in five-judge panels (around 5.7%) is higher than that 
appearing in written decisions of the more usual two- or three-judge 
panel for the same period (around 2.5%),34 although a reduced statistical 
                                                          
32 For consistency, the year of issue of a decision was taken as the reference point 
notwithstanding that in a small number of cases the decision was issued after oral 
arguments had been heard in the previous year. 
33 Public Prosecutor v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112; The Royal Bank of Scotland NV v 
TT International Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 1104. On dissenting and concurring judgments 
in Singapore generally, see Lau Kwan Ho, “A Study in Separate Judgments” in 
Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan eds) (Academy 
Publishing, 2015) ch 4. 
34 For recent dissents and concurrences emanating from three-judge panels of the 
Court of Appeal, see Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan [2015] 1 SLR 834; 
PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK v CRW Joint Operation [2015] 
4 SLR 364; Asnah bte Ab Rahman v Li Jianlin [2016] 2 SLR 944; Grains and 
Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India [2016] 3 SLR 1308; Attorney-
General v Ting Choon Meng [2017] 1 SLR 373; Harven a/l Segar v Public Prosecutor 
[2017] 1 SLR 771; Gopu Jaya Raman v Public Prosecutor [2018] 1 SLR 499; and 
Mohamed Affandi bin Rosli v Public Prosecutor [2019] 1 SLR 440. This occurrence 
of dissent and concurrence in smaller panels is itself generally consistent with 
historical averages: see Lau Kwan Ho, “A Study in Separate Judgments” in 
Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan eds) (Academy 
Publishing, 2015) at paras 4.22 and 4.26. 
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significance may be unavoidable here owing to the inherent limitation 
on sample size. 
20 Turning to the judges who sat on these expanded panels in 
Singapore, 18 of the 35 cases were first heard by a court that comprised 
permanent members of the Court of Appeal as well as other High Court 
judges sitting ad hoc. Panels composed entirely of permanent members 
heard the other 17 cases. The backstory here is likely to be one of 
timing. It is only since August 2016 that there have been at least five 
permanent members of the Court of Appeal at any given point in time.35 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, all of the cases that were first heard by a five-
judge Court of Appeal prior to August 2016 included at least one High 
Court judge sitting ad hoc at the Chief Justice’s request. However, from 
that time onwards only seven of the 24 cases where a quintet was 
convened contained a High Court judge on the court when the case first 
came on for hearing;36 the rest were heard by a panel staffed entirely by 
permanent members. It may further be observed that all of the written 
decisions in these 24 cases were penned by a permanent member: 
Menon CJ and Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA lead with seven each, 
followed by Judith Prakash JA (four) and Chao Hick Tin, Tay Yong 
Kwang and Steven Chong Horng Siong JJA (two each). The three judges 
at the top of this authorial leaderboard generally happen also to be the 
more senior of the permanent members, in terms of when they were 
appointed to that court. 
21 On these figures the current practice seems to be that all of the 
permanent members will ordinarily sit when a five-judge court is 
constituted (allowing of course for any debilitating or disentitling 
circumstances), and that the leading judgment will normally be written 
by a permanent member. Is it therefore right, as a matter of terminology, 
                                                          
35 The five permanent members are, as at the time of writing, Sundaresh Menon CJ, 
Andrew Phang Boon Leong, Judith Prakash, Tay Yong Kwang and Steven Chong 
Horng Siong JJA. A sixth judge, Chao Hick Tin SJ, recently took senior status but is 
expected to sit in the Court of Appeal from time to time. And it should 
additionally be noted that Belinda Ang Saw Ean J (judge in charge of the High 
Court), Woo Bih Li J and Quentin Loh Sze-On J (judge in charge of the Singapore 
International Commercial Court) will now also be sitting more frequently in the 
Court of Appeal: Sundaresh Menon, “Response by Chief Justice Sundaresh 
Menon” Opening of the Legal Year 2018, Singapore (8 January 2018) at para 7; 
Sundaresh Menon, “Response by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon” Opening of the 
Legal Year 2019, Singapore (7 January 2019) at para 18. 
36 The seven cases being L Capital Jones Ltd v Maniach Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 312; Hii 
Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien [2017] 2 SLR 492; Tan Cheng Bock v 
Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850; Public Prosecutor v Lam Leng Hung [2018] 
1 SLR 659; Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation Strata Title 
Plan No 301 [2018] 2 SLR 866; Abdul Kahar bin Othman v Public Prosecutor [2018] 
2 SLR 1394; and BOM v BOK [2019] 1 SLR 349. 
© 2019 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 
916 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2019) 31 SAcLJ 
 
to now say that the Singapore Court of Appeal sometimes sits en banc or 
as a full court when all five permanent members are hearing the case? 
That is probably not far wrong but those adopting the parlance should 
presently be slow to associate it with any formal outcome in particular; 
there is certainly no consequence spelt out in the extant legislation.37 
The technical state is, borrowing Lord Greene MR’s words, that what can 
be done by a full court can be done by a division of the court, and what 
cannot be done by a division of the court cannot be done by the full 
court.38 Whether the system will seek to maintain a customary quintet of 
permanent appellate judges and assign it additional distinction awaits 
future reckoning. In this regard, one anticipates that the issue may be 
visited in greater detail when the proposed reform of the appellate 
structure within the Supreme Court is deliberated upon in due course.39 
B. The cases 
22 With these initial observations in mind the 35 recent cases that 
were thought to merit consideration by an exceptional Court of Appeal 
of five judges can be examined more closely. Which category – 
jurisprudential significance, difficulty or unsettledness – do they belong 
to? The inquiry can be a subjective one and there might be cases that 
could be said to fall into more than one category. In these multiplicative 
instances the author has sought to highlight the thinking in 
classification below. As alluded to earlier, it may not always be entirely 
satisfactory to take the categories as being discrete from each other, but 
in the author’s view the exercise is still useful as a broad assessment of 
the types of cases which have come before an enlarged panel of judges. 
23 Beginning with difficulty, it can be comfortably said that at least 
ten of the 35 decisions featured one or more legal issues for 
determination carrying with them a major degree of difficulty. These 
                                                          
37 One historical example of a consequence laid down by legislative implication was 
in s 9 of the New Zealand Judicature Amendment Act 1913 (1913 No 41) 
(discussed in In re Rayner [1948] NZLR 455 at 485). The comparativist can also 
follow the interesting study of the en banc procedure in the US Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit in Stephen L Wasby, “Why Sit En Banc?” (2012) 63 Hastings 
LJ 747. 
38 Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718 at 725. This decision regarding the 
Court of Appeal prompted Sir Robert Megarry to wonder, extra-judicially, whether 
it might be desirable for a court of five or more to have power to reconsider earlier 
decisions of a court of three: Robert E Megarry, “Decisions by Equally Divided 
Courts as Precedents” (1954) 70 LQR 318 at 321; Robert E Megarry, “Fair Wear 
and Tear and the Doctrine of Precedent” (1958) 74 LQR 33 at 37–38. See also Mah 
Kah Yew v Public Prosecutor [1968–1970] SLR(R) 851 at [1]. 
39 For more on this proposed reform, see Edwin Tong, Senior Minister of State for 
Law and Health, keynote address at the Litigation Conference 2019, Singapore 
(22 April 2019) at paras 88–100. 
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include ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd40 (upkeep costs of child 
wrongly fathered with stranger’s sperm during in-vitro fertilisation), 
Sanum Investments Ltd v Government of the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic41 (interpretation of bilateral investment treaty), Swissbourgh 
Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd v Kingdom of Lesotho42 (jurisdiction of 
tribunal in international investment arbitration) and Société des Produits 
Nestlé SA v Petra Foods Ltd43 (trade marks over shapes). The other cases 
similarly presented complex legal issues but could on another 
perspective also fall within a different category: a quartet of contract law 
cases – PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd v Airtrust (Hong Kong) 
Ltd,44 The STX Mumbai,45 Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong 
Hua46 (“Turf Club”) (respectively discussing the unsettled issues of 
punitive damages for breach of contract, anticipatory breach for 
executed contracts, and Wrotham Park and AG v Blake damages)47 and 
Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui48 (“Ochroid”) (a decision on 
illegality easily qualifying as jurisprudentially significant) – as well as 
The Royal Bank of Scotland NV v TT International Ltd,49 which required 
intricate analysis of a number of unsettled areas of the law. Special 
mention must be made of Public Prosecutor v Lam Leng Hung,50 in 
which the Singapore Court of Appeal was not only concerned with the 
difficult interpretation of a criminal statute going against some previous 
authorities but also had to answer certain questions of law that split a 
three-judge panel of the High Court below.51 This happens to be the first 
                                                          
40 [2017] 1 SLR 918. 
41 [2016] 5 SLR 536. 
42 [2019] 1 SLR 263. 
43 [2017] 1 SLR 35. 
44 [2017] 2 SLR 129. 
45 [2015] 5 SLR 1. 
46 [2018] 2 SLR 655. 
47 So named after the decisions of Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd 
[1974] 1 WLR 798 and Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268. 
48 [2018] 1 SLR 363. 
49 [2015] 5 SLR 1104. 
50 [2018] 1 SLR 659. 
51 The occurrence of three-judge panels of the High Court (including for the hearing 
of Magistrate’s Appeals) has increased in recent years. As at the time of writing, 
excluding sittings of the Singapore International Commercial Court, at least 
15 reported decisions have been issued in the last five years by such multi-member 
panels: Public Prosecutor v Hue An Li [2014] 4 SLR 661; Mohammed Ibrahim 
s/o Hamzah v Public Prosecutor [2015] 1 SLR 1081; Mohamad Fairuuz bin Saleh v 
Public Prosecutor [2015] 1 SLR 1145; Public Prosecutor v Ng Sae Kiat [2015] 
5 SLR 167; Chew Soo Chun v Public Prosecutor [2016] 2 SLR 78; Sim Yeow Kee v 
Public Prosecutor [2016] 5 SLR 936; Koh Yong Chiah v Public Prosecutor [2017] 
3 SLR 447; Public Prosecutor v Lam Leng Hung [2017] 4 SLR 474; TUC v TUD 
[2017] 4 SLR 877; Chinpo Shipping Co (Pte) Ltd v Public Prosecutor [2017] 
4 SLR 983; Public Prosecutor v Sakthikanesh s/o Chidambaram [2017] 5 SLR 707; 
Amin bin Abdullah v Public Prosecutor [2017] 5 SLR 904; Public Prosecutor v Yeo 
Ek Boon, Jeffrey [2018] 3 SLR 1080; the composite decision in Tay Wee Kiat v 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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modern instance in Singapore of a five-judge Court of Appeal having to 
consider the decision of a three-judge High Court made in the very 
same matter itself. It may, quite naturally, be thought appropriate by 
some that a larger panel should sit in review of a smaller panel’s 
decision – the numbers theory will be considered in more detail below – 
although in Singapore it is too soon to tell whether the case heralds a 
consistent practice in this regard. 
24 A further 11 cases can probably be identified as belonging in the 
“unsettled” category. Each of the decisions in The Chem Orchid,52 
L Capital Jones Ltd v Maniach Pte Ltd,53 Global Yellow Pages Ltd v 
Promedia Directories Pte Ltd,54 Pram Nair v Public Prosecutor,55 Chan 
Lung Kien v Chan Shwe Ching56 and Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte 
Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd57 revisited, or had to clarify or 
extend, the reasoning in some older Singapore authorities. In four other 
cases the court had to deal with issues on which differing approaches 
had been taken (or suggested to be taken) in various jurisdictions.58 And 
while there was no doubt that the main issue in UDA v UDB59 was 
unsettled given the state of the prior authorities, that case certainly also 
qualified as jurisprudentially significant, touching as it did on the 
potential conflict and overlap of the matrimonial and general civil 
jurisdictions in a property ownership dispute. 
25 Moving on to the “jurisprudential significance” category – 
which, for the purpose of classification in this commentary, represents 
those cases that are important from the perspective of legal or 
jurisprudential development but do not feature especially difficult or 
unsettled issues – not less than five cases should independently make 
the cut. Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien60 refined the 
                                                                                                                               
Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 1315 and [2018] 5 SLR 438; and UKM v Attorney-
General [2018] SGHCF 18. For a discussion of the criminal cases, see Amardeep 
Singh s/o Gurcharan Singh, “Sentencing Reform in Singapore: Are the Guidelines 
in England and Wales a Useful Model?” (2018) 30 SAcLJ 175 at 181–187,  
paras 11–21. See also Lau Kwan Ho, “The High Court as De Facto Court of Appeal: 
A Revisitation of Leave Requirements in the Criminal and Family Court 
Jurisdictions” [2019] SingJLS (forthcoming). 
52 [2016] 2 SLR 50. 
53 [2017] 1 SLR 312. 
54 [2017] 2 SLR 185. 
55 [2017] 2 SLR 1015. 
56 [2018] 2 SLR 84. 
57 [2018] 2 SLR 1271. 
58 Goh Lay Khim v Isabel Redrup Agency Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 546; Ng Huat Seng v 
Munib Mohammad Madni [2017] 2 SLR 1074; Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v 
Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 [2018] 2 SLR 866; BOM v BOK 
[2019] 1 SLR 349. 
59 [2018] 1 SLR 1015. 
60 [2017] 2 SLR 492. 
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treatment of the combined Bolam and Bolitho test for medical 
negligence, while Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Novartis (Singapore) Pte 
Ltd61 involved (among other issues) the validity of Swiss-style claims 
under the Singapore patent registration system. The other three cases 
involved the construction of newly enacted statutory provisions that had 
been designed purposefully to be of remedial application to identified 
classes of persons.62 
26 This leaves a few remaining cases which do not fit easily into the 
stated categories. Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua63 
and the three subsequent Kho Jabing cases64 can be quickly dealt with; 
given that the initial appeal had already been decided by five judges, the 
related matters were, quite rightly, heard by the same line-up. Next, 
a trio of cases demonstrates that the public importance of the decision 
potentially also justifies the matter being heard by an enlarged court of 
five. TMO v TMP,65 Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General66 and Diablo 
Fortune Inc v Duncan, Cameron Lindsay67 could all be characterised as 
involving a relatively straightforward question of legislative 
interpretation, but it was possibly their added signal and embracive 
importance – these were decisions respectively impacting the Muslim 
community, the presidential election and the shipping industry – which 
the court viewed to support determination by an expanded court. And, 
finally, Muhammad Ridzuan bin Md Ali v Public Prosecutor68 and 
SK Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v Conchubar Aromatics Ltd69 are 
probably the only cases in which there appears little going for them (in 
terms of a heightened legal or public interest) to justify decision by an 
exceptional five-judge court, instead of the usual three judges. 
C. Further conclusions 
27 Drawing the strands together some conclusions can be reached 
regarding the expansionary practice of the Court of Appeal. As seen 
above, there is no overt indication that enlarged courts will only be 
                                                          
61 [2017] 2 SLR 707. 
62 Public Prosecutor v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112; Ting Shwu Ping v Scanone Pte Ltd 
[2017] 1 SLR 95; Abdul Kahar bin Othman v Public Prosecutor [2018] 2 SLR 1394. 
63 [2019] 1 SLR 214. 
64 Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 135 (CA); [2016] 3 SLR 1259 (CA); 
Kho Jabing v Attorney-General [2016] 3 SLR 1273. 
65 [2017] 1 SLR 585. 
66 [2017] 2 SLR 850. 
67 [2018] 2 SLR 129. The court’s ruling that a shipowner’s lien was a registrable 
charge has since been superseded by legislation: Companies (Amendment) Act 
2018 (Act 35 of 2018) s 2. 
68 [2014] 3 SLR 721. 
69 [2017] 2 SLR 898. 
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constituted where particular fields of law are in issue; rather, they have 
been readily summoned in cases across a number of diverse areas, 
although the mere fact that a case is criminal does not appear to suffice 
as a justification. An analysis of the actual decisions supports the view 
that the main emphasis has instead been on the difficulty or 
unsettledness of the issues up for determination, with a sizeable number 
of residual cases justifying decision by an enlarged panel because of the 
jurisprudential or legal significance of the matter, or, variously, the 
public importance and implications of the result for a substantial section 
of society. 
28 As illustrated earlier, the tally further indicates a general 
increase in the occurrence of five-judge panels in the Singapore Court of 
Appeal, with the written decisions of such panels peaking in 2017 at 
around 17.1% of the total number of written decisions issued. How does 
this compare with the apex courts in Australia and the UK? The High 
Court of Australia and the UK Supreme Court each ordinarily sits with 
five judges, but this number may on occasion be enlarged. The following 
table records the rounded-off percentages of, for the High Court, 
written decisions where the case was heard by an expanded court, and, 
for the Supreme Court, appeals which were heard by an expanded court 
for the past nine years (the comparison is different owing to limitations 
on the available data). 
Year70 Percentage of HCA written 
decisions where case was heard 
by an expanded court71 
Percentage of UKSC 
appeals heard by an 
expanded court72 
2009 32.7% 23.3% 
                                                          
70 For the High Court of Australia, the year of study is the relevant calendar year. For 
the UK Supreme Court, the year of study is the one-year period beginning on 
1 April of that year (save that of 2009, where the relevant period was 1 October 
2009 (the date the court commenced operations) to 31 March 2010). 
71 The relevant figures are obtained from the annual studies conducted by Andrew 
Lynch and George Williams: see “The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 
2009 Statistics” (2010) 33 UNSWLJ 267 at 272; “The High Court on Constitutional 
Law: The 2010 Statistics” (2011) 34 UNSWLJ 1030 at 1036; “The High Court on 
Constitutional Law: The 2011 Statistics” (2012) 35 UNSWLJ 846 at 850; “The High 
Court on Constitutional Law: The 2012 Statistics” (2013) 36 UNSWLJ 514  
at 517–518; “The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2013 Statistics” (2014) 
37 UNSWLJ 544 at 550; “The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2014 Statistics” 
(2015) 38 UNSWLJ 1078 at 1082; “The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2015 
Statistics” (2016) 39 UNSWLJ 1161 at 1166; “The High Court on Constitutional Law: 
The 2016 Statistics” (2017) 40 UNSWLJ 1468 at 1472; “The High Court on 
Constitutional Law: The 2017 Statistics” (2018) 41 UNSWLJ 1134 at 1141. 
72 The relevant figures are obtained from the annual reports of the UK Supreme 
Court, available at https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/planning-and-governance.
html (accessed March 2019). 
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2010 41.7% 35.5% 
2011 45.8% 29.0% 
2012 41.0% 12.0% 
2013 41.8% 5.0% 
2014 22.4% 12.4% 
2015 33.3% 14.1% 
2016 28.6% 12.1% 
2017 37.3% 7.1% 
29 In the UK Supreme Court there has been a noticeable drop in 
the percentages since 2012 – perhaps partly down to Lord Neuberger of 
Abbotsbury succeeding Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers as the court’s 
president that year73 and partly for caseload management reasons74 – but 
at least on the basis of the more recent annualised figures the Singapore 
Court of Appeal is utilising the expansionary practice along a similar 
pace. Both these courts though far trail the approximated numbers in 
the High Court of Australia, which are consistently elevated due in part 
to the latter’s tradition of having the full court hear constitutional 
cases.75 
                                                          
73 Lord Phillips recounted that during his first few years as President there were a 
number of high-profile appeals involving important public law issues which were 
thought appropriate for decision by an expanded panel: Lord Phillips of Worth 
Matravers, “The Birth and First Steps of the UK Supreme Court” (2012) 
1(2) CJICL 9 at 11; see also Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and 
the Supreme Court (Hart Publishing, 2013) at p 195 and Rosemary Hunter & Erika 
Rackley, “Judicial Leadership on the UK Supreme Court” (2018) 38 LS 191 at 201. 
Lord Neuberger, on the other hand, could not be said to have been exceedingly 
enthused over expanded courts; while acknowledging the concern that different 
judges having different outlooks could be said to support a case for having more 
panels with seven or nine justices, his view was that some cases simply did not 
merit more than five justices, enlarged panels could lead to more delay before 
judgment, and they made it difficult for more than one panel to sit: Lord 
Neuberger of Abbotsbury, “Tweaking the Curial Veil” The Blackstone Lecture 
2014, Oxford (15 November 2014) at para 54. A few years later he estimated that 
sitting in panels of five, occasionally seven, and very occasionally nine, enabled the 
UK Supreme Court to get through around twice as many cases as it otherwise 
would, with hearings before five judges normally also more manageable for the 
judges and the advocates: Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, “Twenty Years a Judge: 
Reflections and Refractions” Neill Lecture 2017, Oxford (10 February 2017) 
at para 30. 
74 Described in Penny Darbyshire, “The UK Supreme Court – Is There Anything Left 
to Think About?” (2015) 21 European Journal of Current Legal Issues. 
75 The practice of the High Court of Australia finds detailed coverage in the annual 
studies of Andrew Lynch and George Williams, the more recent of which are cited 
at n 71 above. See also s 23(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). 
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30 A careful reader of the judgments by five-judge panels of the 
Singapore Court of Appeal will generally also find the analyses in them 
to be of extremely high quality. This may well be down to a 
thoroughness of review and consultation between the five sitting 
members; notably, though, more hands do not necessarily mean more 
judgments and there has not been a significant spike in dissents and 
concurrences in five-judge panels, which have remained broadly 
consistent with historical figures.76 At this level of investigation, the 
present suggestion is that putting five judges in the same court room has 
not, for that reason alone, changed the balance or collegiality of the 
Court of Appeal overnight. 
31 It bears pointing out that the high standard of the judgments 
not only is encouraging to immediate court users but bodes well for the 
development of an influential jurisprudence possessing the requisite 
internationalist outlook. These desiderata happen to coincide in one of 
Singapore’s latest offerings. Decisions of the newly created Singapore 
International Commercial Court, which functions as a division of the 
High Court, may be appealed to the Court of Appeal. It is at that point 
open to the parties to agree to make an application for five judges to 
hear the appeal.77 So far, so good. In a move then that emulates the 
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal and goes one better, international 
jurists of renown across the common and civil legal traditions can sit in 
the Singapore Court of Appeal by designation (this has occurred already 
in no less than six cases).78 Given the impressive track record amassed so 
                                                          
76 Some studies in other jurisdictions have concluded that an increase in panel size is 
said to be a factor that increases the probability of disagreement within the relevant 
court: see Charles M Lamb, “A Microlevel Analysis of Appeals Court Conflict: 
Warren Burger and His Colleagues on the DC Circuit” in Judicial Conflict and 
Consensus: Behavioral Studies of American Appellate Courts (Sheldon Goldman & 
Charles M Lamb eds) (University of Kentucky Press, 1986) and Donald R Songer, 
John Szmer & Susan W Johnson, “Explaining Dissent on the Supreme Court of 
Canada” (2011) 44 Canadian Journal of Political Science 389. 
77 Singapore International Commercial Court Practice Directions (effective 
1 November 2018) para 24(3). 
78 See Jacob Agam v BNP Paribas SA [2017] 2 SLR 1 (where Dyson Heydon IJ sat), 
Qilin World Capital Ltd v CPIT Investments Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 1; [2019] 1 SLR 1 
(where Bernard Rix and Dyson Heydon IJJ sat), Yuanta Asset Management 
International Ltd v Telemedia Pacific Group Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 21 (where Bernard 
Rix IJ sat), Bumi Armada Offshore Holdings Ltd v Tozzi Srl [2019] 1 SLR 10 (where 
Beverley McLachlin and David Neuberger IJJ sat), PT Bayan Resources TBK v 
BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd [2019] 1 SLR 30 (where Dyson Heydon IJ sat) and 
BNP Paribas SA v Jacob Agam [2019] 1 SLR 83 (where Dyson Heydon and David 
Neuberger IJJ sat). A full list of the international jurists can be found on the 
website of the Supreme Court of Singapore. For more on the Singapore 
International Commercial Court, see generally Yeo Tiong Min, “Staying Relevant: 
Exercise of Jurisdiction in the Age of the SICC” Eighth Yong Pung How 
Professorship of Law Lecture, Singapore (13 May 2015); Man Yip, “The Resolution 
of Disputes before the Singapore International Commercial Court” (2016) 
(cont’d on the next page) 
© 2019 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 Enlarged Panels in the  
(2019) 31 SAcLJ Court of Appeal of Singapore 923 
 
far, the prospect of more five-judge panels of the Court of Appeal being 
specially constituted to decide important cases, whether of a commercial 
or other nature, in a bid to strengthen the court’s thought leadership in 
the region and across the Commonwealth is inviting. Indeed, the 
general direction that contract law is taking in Singapore has already 
aroused the curiosity of Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd CJ.79 More than 
that, the discerning use of quintets should also build and retain the 
confidence of those who seek a fair, just and practicable resolution of 
their disputes. 
IV. The future of the practice 
32 Subject to the outcome of the proposed structural reform of the 
Supreme Court, which was alluded to earlier,80 there is, in summary, 
little to suggest that the Court of Appeal of Singapore will not continue 
to constitute expanded five-judge panels in appropriate cases in the near 
future. To be sure, that court had before 2014 served its function for five 
decades without more than three judges hearing each case and still 
gained acclaim as one of the leading common law courts in the 
Commonwealth. It is possible to accept this and still appreciate the 
stated rationale for occasional expansions of the panel. Cases pose real 
difficulty for judges due in large part to them having to apply and 
sometimes mould the law to evolving conditions of society. The quicker 
the evolution, the faster the law becomes outdated. In today’s age, where 
heightened interconnectivity means that daily disruptions elsewhere are 
swiftly and acutely felt locally, both legislation and judge-made rules can 
fade into obsolescence as soon as there is a change in the original 
circumstances that prompted their appearance. Given that the general 
difficulty of cases may now be expected to magnify, it is understandable 
                                                                                                                               
65 ICLQ 439; Teh Hwee Hwee, Justin Yeo & Colin Seow, “The Singapore 
International Commercial Court in Action: Illustrations from the First Case” 
(2016) 28 SAcLJ 692; Justin Yeo, “On Appeal from Singapore International 
Commercial Court” (2017) 29 SAcLJ 574; Andrew Godwin, Ian Ramsay & 
Miranda Webster, “International Commercial Courts: The Singapore Experience” 
(2017) 18 Melbourne Journal of International Law 219; and Kenny Chng, “The 
Impact of the Singapore International Commercial Court and Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements on Singapore’s Private International Law” (2018) 
37 CJQ 124. 
79 Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, “Keeping Commercial Law Up to Date” Jill Poole 
Memorial Lecture, Birmingham (8 March 2017) at para 9. Illuminating accounts of 
the Singapore journey can be found in Peh Aik Hin, “Contract Law: 
A Rationalisation Process towards Coherence and Fairness” in Singapore Law – 
50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan eds) (Academy Publishing, 2015) 
ch 10 and Andrew Phang & Goh Yihan, “Contract Law in Commonwealth 
Countries: Uniformity or Divergence?” (2019) 31 SAcLJ 170. 
80 See para 21 above. 
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why consideration by an enlarged five-judge panel would increasingly 
be thought useful when resolving some of those cases. 
33 There are other oft-cited justifications for the enlargement of a 
court. Deliberations upon especially difficult cases by a fuller number 
tend to lend greater certainty to the law by providing a forum where any 
disagreement among more (or even all) members of the court is aired 
and resolved, thereby also settling the issue clearly for the guidance of 
the lower courts in future cases. And a court constituted by a larger set 
of its permanent members avoids any accusation that a case which was 
especially close (usually but not always on the legal issues) or which held 
particular public importance (such as one having political or human 
rights dimensions) might have been decided another way if the court 
had been differently constituted. 
34 Against the perceived benefits are some natural limiting and 
countervailing forces. As a matter of judicial administration, the greater 
frequency of enlarged courts is likely to result in a slowing down of the 
disposal rate, since each judge will be individually engaging with more 
disparate cases. The obvious benefit to sitting in panels (as opposed to 
sitting en banc) is that the same number of judges – here it must be 
remembered that we have not an unlimited supply of appellate judges – 
can get through more appeals, and that same mathematical certainty 
applies when one is comparing smaller and larger panels. These 
constraints should not be underestimated, a point more senior lawyers 
in Singapore will especially appreciate from history. A further 
(conceptual) problem is in identifying the categories of cases warranting 
an expanded court and avoiding any arbitrary and unfair results if such 
differentiation should portend some very real consequences, such as an 
expanded court possessing greater willingness to overrule or depart 
from an earlier precedent. 
35 All this, in other words, is to say that the considerations which 
go into developing the expansionary practice should be carefully 
balanced. The practice itself must constantly be evaluated for possible 
improvement.81 Fundamentally, that evaluation requires addressing 
historical concerns over transparency and accountability as well as 
conceptual questions about the use of multi-membered panels in the 
business of judging. It is thus helpful to understand and clarify some 
aspects of the practice before thinking further about its refinement. 
                                                          
81 A useful study on Canada may be found in Benjamin Alarie, Andrew Green & 
Edward Iacobucci, “Is Bigger Always Better? On Optimal Panel Size, with Evidence 
from the Supreme Court of Canada” University of Toronto, Legal Studies Research 
Paper no 08-15 (June 2009). 
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A. Judges and better judging 
36 The justification from expertise provides the main rationale in 
Menon CJ’s proposal to utilise enlarged panels more frequently.82 That 
justification relies on a simple proposition. The more complex a 
problem is, the more attention should be devoted to it, which entails 
putting more judicial heads at the task. 
37 Let us look a bit closer at this. The modern apex court is 
invariably a multi-membered court. The benefits of such group 
decision-making were once described by Karl Llewellyn in the following 
terms:83 
It is trite that a group all of whom take full part is likely to produce a 
net view with wider perspective and fewer extremes than can an 
individual; and it is a fair proposition also that continuity is likely to 
be greater with a group; prior action, attitudes, and unrecorded doubts 
or reservations which an individual can later easily overlook are likely 
to be recalled and revived by some other group member … One 
recalls also that the drive for a written group opinion – with some 
members intent upon the past and typically some members concerned 
about the future – tends also to stabilization and to a consequent rise 
in reckonability in the deciding process itself. 
We observe that there can be both positive-type benefits (the result 
arrived at by a group is one of wider perspective) and negative-type 
benefits (a group is less likely to overlook elements which bear relevantly 
on the decision; at the same time there is an evening out of any extreme 
positions within the group). 
38 Harry Jones (who himself was mentored by Llewellyn) 
discussed further the negative-type benefits by perceptively asking what 
exactly made judicial decision-making so different from other 
disciplines (such as art, literature and the natural sciences) where the 
greatest results were achievements not of group action but of the 
individual creative mind.84 He suggested (correctly in my view) that 
judges, unlike artists, poets or scientists, were not completely 
                                                          
82 Notably, some academic writing has also pointed to diversity of debate as the main 
purpose for empanelling a larger court: Margaret J Beazley, Paul T Vout & Sally 
E Fitzgerald, Appeals and Appellate Courts in Australia and New Zealand 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 2014) at para 3.29. 
83 Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Little Brown, 1960) 
at pp 31–32. Llewellyn further highlighted the following advantages of group 
decision making in appellate benches: an increased likelihood of vision and 
balance, as well as safety factors against bias, effective corruption, improper 
influence, overhaste and sickness. 
84 Harry W Jones, “Multitude of Counselors: Appellate Adjudication As Group 
Decision-Making” (1980) 54 Tul L Rev 541 at 552–553. 
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autonomous in their ambit of action; when ruling on cases they had to 
follow authoritative sources of law and accept the traditional and 
political limits placed on the judicial function. Without this sort of 
restraint the judgments of courts could not be counted on as sources of 
guidance for future action.85 
39 It is of course the positive-type benefits which appear to be the 
main driver in Menon CJ’s statement on the occasional expansion from 
trio to quintet. Every judge brings a unique expertise to a case.86 It is 
particularly an advantage in multi-membered courts, where horses may 
sprint for different courses and the specialist on the topic can offer the 
other members an especially deep well of knowledge to tap on. As one 
instance in the UK, Lord Hope of Craighead points out that it was 
desirable for Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe to have delivered the main 
judgment in BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 
2007-3BL plc,87 the latter being an undoubted specialist in insolvency 
law.88 Lord Walker himself once said that he expected to sit on quite a lot 
of “chancery-type” cases.89 In the UK, it has indeed been some years now 
that cases in the Supreme Court (and its predecessor, the House of 
Lords) as well as in the Court of Appeal of England and Wales are 
assigned for hearing by a mix of subject specialists and non-specialists.90 
                                                          
85 Harry W Jones, “Multitude of Counselors: Appellate Adjudication As Group 
Decision-Making” (1980) 54 Tul L Rev 541 at 553. 
86 David Pannick, “‘Better That a Horse Should Have a Voice in the House [of Lords] 
Than That a Judge Should’ (Jeremy Bentham): Replacing the Law Lords by a 
Supreme Court” [2009] PL 723 at 733–734. 
87 [2013] 1 WLR 1408. 
88 Lord Hope of Craighead, “A Light at the End of the Tunnel? – BNY in the UK 
Supreme Court”, speech at Banking and Financial Services Law Association, Gold 
Coast, Australia (29 August 2013). 
89 Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, “Moving In and Moving On – One Justice’s View” 
(2011) 7(2) Cambridge Student Law Review 1 at 2. 
90 John Donaldson, “The Office of Master of the Rolls” (1984) 17 Bracton LJ 19 at 21; 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill, “A New Supreme Court for the United Kingdom”, 
Spring Lecture 2002 at The Constitution Unit, London (1 May 2002); Lord Hope 
of Craighead, “The Creation of the Supreme Court – Was It Worth It?” Barnard’s 
Inn Reading, London (24 June 2010); Lord Hope of Craighead, “Do We Really 
Need a Supreme Court?”, speech at Newcastle Law School (25 November 2010); 
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, “Tweaking the Curial Veil” The Blackstone 
Lecture 2014, Oxford (15 November 2014) at para 46; Lord Neuberger of 
Abbotsbury, “The Role of the Supreme Court Seven Years On – Lessons Learnt” 
Bar Council Law Reform Lecture 2016, London (21 November 2016) at para 24; 
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, “Twenty Years a Judge: Reflections and 
Refractions” Neill Lecture 2017, Oxford (10 February 2017) at para 22; Baroness 
Hale of Richmond, “Judges, Power and Accountability: Constitutional 
Implications of Judicial Selection”, speech at Constitutional Law Summer School, 
Belfast (11 August 2017); Baroness Hale of Richmond, “Should the Law Lords 
Have Left the House of Lords?” Michael Ryle Lecture 2018, London (14 November 
2018); Lord Reed, “The Supreme Court Ten Years On” Bentham Association 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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40 Now there is quite properly a line not to be crossed in that no 
judge should defer excessively and give undue weight to another judge’s 
views,91 but it is a very bright line and modern-day tribunals, at least, are 
on constant alert to observe the right side of it. Provided that this is 
respected, the inclusion of subject experts in an expanded court can be 
helpful in the disposal of certain cases. Here – and with due 
consideration for the views held by Sir Richard Buxton, who featured on 
many panels in the Court of Appeal of England and Wales – it is 
possible that the generalist judge may even after listening to the 
arguments of learned counsel in an arcane area still take something 
away from the internal conferences with his or her specialist 
colleague.92 
41 One can recount examples of the thoughtful selection of 
personnel. In Singapore, the five-judge court in Société des Produits 
Nestlé SA v Petra Foods Ltd (a trade marks case) included an intellectual 
property specialist in George Wei J. In England and Wales, Nowotnik v 
Nowotnik,93 an appeal on a point of family law practice, was decided by a 
quintet of which three had had prior experience of the matrimonial 
jurisdiction. In Heil v Rankin,94 the five members of the court who 
reviewed the principles for the awarding of damages for pain, suffering 
and loss of amenity not only had the relevant professional experience 
but were of differing seniority, thus ensuring that their overall 
experience would cover a substantial period of time. In re Trinity Mirror 
plc,95 an important case about restrictions on media coverage of criminal 
trials where the interests of children might be affected, was heard by an 
exceptionally strong five-judge court that included the Lord Chief 
Justice and the President of the Family Division. In R v McLoughlin,96 
again it was a panel of five, this time composed of the Lord Chief Justice, 
the President of the Queen’s Bench Division, the Vice President of the 
Criminal Division, Treacy LJ (then Chairman of the Sentencing 
                                                                                                                               
Lecture 2019, London (6 March 2019); Baroness Hale of Richmond, “What is the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court For?” Macfadyen Lecture 2019, Edinburgh 
(28 March 2019). See also the answers given to a Freedom of Information Act 2000 
(c 36) inquiry discussed further in Brice Dickson, “The Processing of Appeals in 
the House of Lords” (2007) 123 LQR 571 at 589–590. And further insight on the 
selection process and profile may respectively be located in Alan Paterson, Final 
Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart Publishing, 2013) 
at pp 70–73; Rosemary Hunter & Erika Rackley, “Judicial Leadership on the UK 
Supreme Court” (2018) 38 LS 191 at 209–213. 
91 Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig v Albion Water [2008] EWCA Civ 97 at [17]. 
92 Contra Richard Buxton, “Sitting En Banc in the New Supreme Court” (2009) 
125 LQR 288 at 292. 
93 [1967] P 83 (referred to in Gooday v Gooday [1968] 3 WLR 750 at 759). 
94 [2001] QB 272. 
95 [2008] QB 770. 
96 [2014] 1 WLR 3964. 
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Council) and Burnett J (as he then was), that ruled on the compatibility 
of the whole life order with Art 3 of the ECHR. More recently, two 
significant criminal matters were decided by five-judge courts that 
included the Lord Chief Justice and the President of the Queen’s Bench 
Division.97 
42 The enlargement of the court therefore seems a practical and 
legitimate device to draft in additional insight and specialist expertise. It 
is franked by the reasonable supposition that difficult cases require an 
even closer and more multifarious inspection of views than is usual in 
order to arrive at a correct, well-reasoned decision. And it is not just 
these traditional primacies which might be thought to merit an invite; 
the current debate over greater diversity in the Judiciary appears to be 
slowly but surely moving in a certain direction,98 the outcome of which 
can eventually be expected to percolate through to the actual 
composition of appellate courts in particular cases. All in all, and 
borrowing Brennan J’s mixed metaphors, one can strive to generate a 
marketplace of ideas, a judicial town meeting.99 A supreme caucus was 
certainly convened in Allen v Flood,100 where no less than 17 foreheads 
famously collided in the House of Lords in a Victorian tortious 
conspiracy case that was said to possibly carry rather tremendous 
consequences for the unionist landscape at the time.101 Other instances 
in the UK which have justified the summoning of more hands to the 
                                                          
97 R v Hunter [2015] 1 WLR 5367; R v Kahar [2016] 1 WLR 3156. See also R v 
Goodyear [2005] 1 WLR 2532; R v James [2006] QB 588. 
98 One recent development saw Mrs Justice Prakash appointed as Singapore’s first 
female Judge of Appeal. In the UK, Baroness Hale of Richmond has been a 
prominent judicial advocate in this area. Hark, for example, her call in Granatino v 
Radmacher [2011] 1 AC 534 at [137] as well as her extra-curial exhortations in 
Brenda Hale, “Equality and the Judiciary: Why Should We Want More Women 
Judges?” [2001] PL 489; Brenda Hale, “Equality in the Judiciary: A Tale of Two 
Continents” 10th Pilgrim Fathers’ Lecture, Plymouth (24 October 2003); Baroness 
Hale of Richmond, “It’s a Man’s World: Redressing the Balance” Norfolk Law 
Lecture 2012, Norwich (16 February 2012); Baroness Hale of Richmond, “Women 
in the Judiciary” Fiona Woolf Lecture for the Women Lawyers’ Division of the Law 
Society, London (27 June 2014); Baroness Hale of Richmond, “Appointments to 
the Supreme Court”, speech at the Conference to Mark the Tenth Anniversary of 
the Judicial Appointments Commission, Birmingham (6 November 2015); 
Baroness Hale of Richmond, “Judges, Power and Accountability: Constitutional 
Implications of Judicial Selection”, speech at Constitutional Law Summer School, 
Belfast (11 August 2017); Baroness Hale of Richmond, “2018 – A Year of 
Anniversaries” 2018 Pankhurst Lecture, Manchester (8 February 2018); and 
Baroness Hale of Richmond, “100 Years of Women in the Law: From Bertha Cave 
to Brenda Hale”, speech at King’s College London, London (20 March 2019). 
99 William J Brennan Jr, “In Defense of Dissents” (1986) 37 Hastings LJ 427 at 430. 
100 [1898] AC 1. 
101 An engaging discussion of the judicial personalities involved can be found in 
Robert F V Heuston, “Legal Prosopography” (1986) 102 LQR 90. 
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table since the Judicature Acts of 1873102 and 1875103 are where 
conflicting authorities are to be reconciled, guiding principles laid 
down, relatively controversial or significant issues resolved, or 
inconvenient precedents overruled.104 
43 So far as criminal matters are concerned, a further reason may 
stem from the default rule in the old English Court of Criminal Appeal, 
now the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal (“CACD”), that that 
court must issue a solitary judgment unless it is convenient for its 
members to pronounce separate judgments.105 Its main rationale has 
been stated at various times to be a judicial obligation to set the criminal 
law definitively in a single opinion to guide the lower courts, and to 
uphold the moral legitimacy of the meted punishment without having 
the offender tilt hopelessly at a favourable but impotent dissent.106 Short 
of overtaxing this commentary by wading into the debate over the 
continued desirability of the rule, it suffices to note as one of its 
corollaries that the sometime practice has been for a criminal court 
                                                          
102 c 66 (UK). 
103 c 77 (UK). 
104 The criteria in the UK Supreme Court for considering whether more than five 
justices should sit on a panel have already been described above. Admittedly they 
do not fully explain why seven judges should be summoned in some cases and nine 
in others (on this, see Brice Dickson, “The Processing of Appeals in the House of 
Lords” (2007) 123 LQR 571 at 601 and Andrew Burrows, “Numbers Sitting in the 
Supreme Court” (2013) 129 LQR 305 at 309), but the current President of the court 
has since stated that at least seven will sit if the court is being asked to depart from 
a previous decision of the House of Lords or the Supreme Court, and that nine will 
sit if the court has to reconcile conflicting decisions at that or Privy Council level: 
Baroness Hale of Richmond, “Should the Law Lords Have Left the House of 
Lords?” Michael Ryle Lecture 2018, London (14 November 2018). For historical 
expansions in the UK Supreme Court and other courts, see the decisions cited at 
nn 93–97 above and 149 below, and also Winyard v Toogood (1882) 10 QBD 218; 
R v Labouchere (1884) 12 QBD 320; R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658; R v Taylor 
[1950] 2 KB 368; Willcock v Muckle [1951] 2 KB 844; R v McBride [1962] 2 QB 167; 
Ibralebbe v The Queen [1964] 1 AC 900; R v Arkle (1972) 56 Cr App R 722; R v 
Watson [1988] 1 QB 690; Taylor v Lawrence [2003] QB 528; R v Simpson [2004] 
QB 118; Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 2004) [2004] 1 WLR 2111; 
Matthew v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 AC 433; Attorney General for 
Jersey v Holley [2005] 2 AC 580; R v Rowe [2007] QB 975; Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v AF (No 3) [2010] 2 AC 269; R v F [2012] 2 WLR 1038; 
R (KM) v Cambridgeshire County Council [2012] 3 All ER 1218; R v Oakes [2013] 
QB 979; and Willers v Joyce (No 2) [2016] 3 WLR 534. 
105 Senior Courts Act 1981 (c 54) (UK) s 59. 
106 Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Court of Criminal Appeal 
(Cmnd 2755, 1965) at para 250; James Fitzjames Stephen, A General View of the 
Criminal Law of England (Macmillan, 2nd Ed, 1890) at p 178 (quoted in “Topics of 
the Month” (1927) 5 Can Bar Rev 424 at 429). This is discussed further (and 
against the Singapore context) in Lau Kwan Ho, “A Study in Separate Judgments” 
in Singapore Law – 50 Years in the Making (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan eds) (Academy 
Publishing, 2015) at paras 4.55–4.58. 
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divided after the initial hearing to have the parties reargue the matter 
before a larger panel.107 The immediate significance here is that the 
Singapore Court of Appeal happens to be subject to an equivalent 
default rule as the CACD.108 To date only one reported criminal case 
exists in Singapore where a matter was reargued before an enlarged 
court,109 and that having taken place more than two decades ago the 
practice (if ever there was one established in Singapore) can probably be 
said to have fallen into desuetude. 
B. Counting the number of heads 
44 The Singapore Court of Appeal holds an important distinction 
as the apex court within its jurisdiction. This supremacy is relevant to 
the expansionary practice in at least two ways. The first relates to how 
the court is not strictly bound by its previous decisions.110 In Singapore, 
there is little doubt that the top court possesses the power whether it sits 
as a panel of two, three, five, seven or more to depart from its older 
rulings in an appropriate case. In other words, the power rests upon the 
court as a whole without reference to its membership numbers at any 
given time (the only requirement is that it has to have acted through a 
quorum). However, to avoid the distorted optical effect the public would 
otherwise witness, not to mention the additional matter of preservation 
of judicial comity, it may be a point of institutional practice (in many 
parts of the common law world) that a decision made by a specially 
enlarged tribunal will not usually be departed from or overruled by a 
smaller-sized panel even if both panels are, constitutionally speaking, 
co-ordinate actors. That is not to say it has not been done before; it 
certainly has, and perhaps more readily in a criminal case where the 
rules of precedent must yield to personal liberty if that is what justice 
requires.111 By convention, however, and speaking to the matter 
                                                          
107 Discussions of the practice can be found in R v Healey (1956) 40 Cr App R 40 at 42 
and R v Shama [1990] 1 WLR 661 at 662–663. See also Lord Goddard, “The Court 
of Criminal Appeal in England” (1950) 67 South African Law Journal 115 at 117. 
108 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) ss 298(6)–298(7). 
109 Mok Swee Kok v Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 134. 
110 Pursuant to the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1994] 2 SLR 689, similar to 
that issued by the House of Lords at [1966] 1 WLR 1234 and now applicable in the 
UK Supreme Court: Austin v Southwark London Borough Council [2011] 1 AC 355 
at [24]–[25]; UK Supreme Court Practice Directions 3 and 4. For a discussion of 
the position in Singapore, see Lau Kwan Ho, “The 1994 Practice Statement and 
Twenty Years On” [2014] SingJLS 408. 
111 In the UK, see, for instance, Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 (distinguishing and 
not following Duncan v Cammell, Laird and Co Ltd [1942] AC 624); R v Gould 
[1968] 2 QB 65 (overruling R v Wheat [1921] 2 KB 119); Hanning v Maitland 
(No 2) [1970] 1 QB 580 (not following Nowotnik v Nowotnik [1967] P 83); R v R 
[2004] 1 WLR 490 (not following R v T [2003] 4 All ER 877); contra R v Felstead 
(1914) 9 Cr App R 227. In Malaysia, see, for instance, Mohd Amin bin Mohd Razali 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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generally, if it is sought to impugn or derogate from the ruling of the 
first enlarged court, a second panel composed of an equal or greater 
number of judges should be convened for this purpose. This is the case 
in Australia,112 New Zealand113 and the UK.114 The practice, which does 
not appear immediately unsound, ought not to be confined to only 
those common law jurisdictions. It can be supported as an aspect of 
maintaining the “soft” legitimacy of the later decision in the eyes of the 
hoi polloi: justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. The 
public might wonder whether something had gone awry with the 
administration of justice were a quintet’s decision to be cast aside by a 
later trio (or a septet overruled by a quintet) bearing in mind that the 
numerically smaller group was in fact sitting no higher than the larger 
group but only in the same court and at the same level of hierarchy. 
45 It is more generally about the way in which precedents are 
treated. As Lord Wilberforce stated in modern terms, the law knows of 
no better way to resolve doubtful issues than by the considered majority 
opinion of the ultimate tribunal.115 Another principle is that a shifting of 
the balance of views arising solely from a mere change in membership of 
the tribunal in no way justifies the overruling of authority. This time we 
may quote Lord Pearson as saying that, if a tenable view taken by the 
majority in the first appeal could be overruled by a majority preferring 
another tenable view in a second appeal, then the original tenable view 
could be restored by a majority preferring it in a third appeal; and 
finality of decision would be utterly lost.116 There would seem to follow 
from these two guiding principles a third: should it be deemed 
necessary or desirable to resolve a deep-seated conflict of judicial 
opinion or a question of high legal, constitutional or public importance, 
the apex tribunal could, circumstances permitting, go about this by 
specially convening an enlarged panel in order for the eventual decision 
to be made by what is effectively a super-majority – a majority of all (or 
                                                                                                                               
v Public Prosecutor [2003] 4 MLJ 129 (overruling Public Prosecutor v Sihabduin Bin 
Haji Salleh [1980] 2 MLJ 273). 
112 R v The Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (1912) 15 CLR 586 
at 606; Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) (1987) 162 CLR 645 
at 664–665. 
113 Aoraki Corp Ltd v McGavin [1998] 3 NZLR 276. 
114 Ward v James [1966] 1 QB 273; Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2009] 
1 AC 367 at [19], [61], [82], [115] and [126]; Manchester City Council v Pinnock 
[2011] 2 AC 104 at [47]. 
115 Fitzleet Estates Ltd v Cherry [1977] 1 WLR 1345 at 1349. Cf Jeremy Waldron, “Five 
to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?” (2014) 123 Yale LJ 1692. 
116 Jones v Secretary of State for Social Services [1972] AC 944 at 996–997. See also 
Lewis v Attorney General of Jamaica [2001] 2 AC 50 at 90; Willers v Joyce (No 2) 
[2016] 3 WLR 534 at [9]. For a different view, see Bruce V Harris, “Final Appellate 
Courts Overruling their Own ‘Wrong’ Precedents: The Ongoing Search for 
Principle” (2002) 118 LQR 408 at 420–422. 
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nearly all) of the judges then available to sit – thereby shutting out the 
possibility of other smaller constitutions of the tribunal coming to 
contrasting conclusions on similar cases in the near future.117 It may help 
to avoid, in particularly close or vexing cases, what Lord Oliver of 
Aylmerton gamely described as the “exciting element of lottery” 
introduced by the anomaly of a final and authoritative tribunal sitting 
normally in smaller divisions and not en banc.118 Now it would be 
careless not to equally observe that it was no more than about a decade 
ago when three dissenting judges in Gibson v Government of the United 
States of America119 disagreed that the majority decision of an enlarged 
seven-member committee of the Privy Council was a persuasive reason 
for overruling the precedent authority in question there. This does not, 
however, conflict with the supposition that, where a larger-than-usual 
tribunal is convened with this purpose in mind, it should be deeply 
injurious to the certainty of the law for the resulting decision itself to 
then be overruled in the future by a smaller division of the court. Where 
would the to and fro end? It is not so much a question of the existence of 
the overruling power (any quorate court should have that)120 as whether 
it ought to be exercised under those particular conditions. 
46 For these reasons, therefore, it would not be surprising if this 
non-statutory convention were also to be generally observed in 
Singapore should a quintet’s decision be called into doubt; that is, the 
decision would, practically speaking, likely be overruled or departed 
from only by a court of similar or greater size. 
47 It should be said immediately that the occasion for overruling a 
decision of five is likely to be very uncommon in Singapore, going by 
the barometer of the historical quality of the Court of Appeal’s 
judgments.121 Like Graham Zellick, though, the author suggests that the 
convention should not for this reason escape all scrutiny.122 Certainly 
                                                          
117 See the cases cited at n 114 above, as well as R v Kansal (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 69 
at [19]–[21]; Jones v Kernott [2012] 1 AC 776 at [58]; Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir (No 2) 
[2016] AC 1 at [15]; R (Keyu) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs [2016] AC 1355 at [132]. In Australia, see, for instance, Baker v Campbell 
(1983) 153 CLR 52. 
118 Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, “The Appeal Process” (1992) 2 Journal of Judicial 
Administration 63 at 74. 
119 [2007] 1 WLR 2367. Cf Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, “How Far Should Judges 
Develop the Common Law?” (2014) 3 CJICL 124 at 128. 
120 E Wyndham White, “Stare Decisis: Indecision in the Court of Appeal” (1939) 
3 MLR 66 at 68. 
121 A study of the overruling practice in the Singapore Court of Appeal can be found 
in Lau Kwan Ho, “The 1994 Practice Statement and Twenty Years On” [2014] 
SingJLS 408. 
122 Graham Zellick, “Precedent in the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division” [1974] 
Crim L Rev 222 at 232–233. 
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there is not presumed here any originality in raising this as an issue. An 
observer of the old Court of Criminal Appeal in England once 
rhetorically discussed the notion of a 19-member court having to be 
assembled to reconsider a decision of a 17-member court,123 while 
another commentator wrote that an authoritative pronouncement was 
necessary on the question whether a decision of six lord justices was 
liable to be overturned by a full bench of the Court of Appeal.124 And 
Brice Dickson in his arithmetic appeared implicitly to assume that the 
decision of an expanded panel would likely be reversed only in a case 
heard by an equal- or larger-sized panel.125 So far as this author is aware, 
however, even accounting for some infrequent indications from the 
bench there has been no significantly fuller discussion of how this might 
be fairly, consistently and efficiently achieved in practice. 
48 The issue might in frankness be taken deeper. If the aforesaid 
aspect of public perception is put to one side for the moment, it can be 
asked, validly, if the resort to numbers when deciding whether to abide 
by or move away from a prior ruling is, without more, overly 
simplified.126 The hypothetical 17-member court may seem a remote 
                                                          
123 D Seaborne Davies, “The Court of Criminal Appeal: The First Forty Years” (1951) 
1 JSPTL (ns) 425 at 439. 
124 E Wyndham White, “Stare Decisis: Indecision in the Court of Appeal” (1939) 
3 MLR 66 at 68. 
125 Brice Dickson, “The Processing of Appeals in the House of Lords” (2007) 
123 LQR 571 at 593. 
126 For instance, one can respectfully ask whether a single sentence on court size in 
Kelly & Co v Kellond (1888) 20 QBD 569 at 572 should have sufficiently 
encapsulated the overruling practice of the Court of Appeal at the time. In this age 
it is suspected that more justification will be required. Sir Louis Blom-Cooper and 
Gavin Drewry did say that the straightforward counting of judicial heads was a 
pointless exercise as soon as one appreciated the different roles played by the 
courts at different levels: Louis Blom-Cooper & Gavin Drewry, “The Use of Full 
Courts in the Appellate Process” (1971) 34 MLR 364 at 365. Lord Oliver, 
comparing the House of Lords to the Court of Appeal, quite simply admitted there 
was no necessary or logical reason to suppose that five judges were more likely to 
get it right than three (Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, “The Appeal Process” (1992) 
2 Journal of Judicial Administration 63 at 74); one wonders if he would have agreed 
that seven was greater but no better than five. More recently, Lord Neuberger 
would not himself have had any qualms with a committee of three in the Privy 
Council hearing an appeal from a decision of three judges, but he did not get his 
way for those he had consulted generally still felt that five should sit to consider a 
decision of three: Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, “The Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council in the 21st Century” (2014) 3 CJICL 30 at 45. On the other hand, 
Lord Hope was one of those who thought that there were benefits in the fact that 
the UK Supreme Court sat in larger panels than was usually the case in the Court 
of Appeal: Lord Hope of Craighead, “Do We Really Need a Supreme Court?”, 
speech at Newcastle Law School (25 November 2010). See also a somewhat similar 
opinion of the High Court of Australia in Michael Kirby, “What Is It Really Like to 
Be a Justice of the High Court of Australia? A Conversation between Law Students 
and Justice Kirby” (1997) 19 Syd L Rev 514 at 519. 
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possibility today but, taken ad infinitum, starts to assume absurdly 
comical proportions and should at least prompt further examination. In 
his illuminating essay on judicial decision-making by majority vote, 
Jeremy Waldron dismisses Condorcet’s Jury Theorem as a proper 
legitimisation of majority decisions.127 He may have a point there. 
Certainly, the keeping of judicial score (sometimes even across 
generations) can appear an odd metric by which a litigant measures his 
or her chances of success. Are there not other factors – such as societal 
developments and the occasional upheaval in morality, not to mention 
the allelopathic and seemingly relentless propagation of primary and 
secondary legislation in just about every area of life – which feed into 
the judicial mill to make this more than just a numbers game? 
49 One can imagine also practical and conceptual objections being 
taken where the actual legal result was partly (but critically) dependent 
upon the decisions made to list different cases for hearing before panels 
of differing sizes. In R v Simpson,128 Lord Woolf CJ, delivering the 
judgment of the court, said with some delicacy that the fact of the 
CACD sitting in a five-judge constitution (rather than the usual three) 
was of relevance in deciding whether it would depart from a previous 
authority. The CACD being ordinarily bound by its past decisions, this 
was undoubtedly a concession to the practicalities of adjudication. What 
the judgment unfortunately did not provide was necessary guidance on 
the anterior (and now extremely significant) question of how the court 
machinery was to differentiate, in a principled way, those cases which 
did, and did not, warrant hearing by an enlarged five-judge panel (now 
apparently possessed of an added discretion to depart from older 
decisions). In New Zealand, the same can be asked of Dahya v Dahya.129 
50 Within recent memory the high-water marks for the expansion 
of courts in the UK must include the Brexit case of R (Miller) v Secretary 
of State for Exiting the European Union130 (“Miller”) and the decision on 
                                                          
127 Jeremy Waldron, “Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?” (2014) 
123 Yale LJ 1692 at 1714–1718. See also Paul H Edelman, “On Legal 
Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem” (2002) 31 J Legal Stud 327; 
Maxwell L Stearns, “The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Judicial Decisionmaking: 
A Reply to Saul Levmore” (2002) 3 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 125. Contra Saul 
Levmore, “More than Mere Majorities” [2000] Utah L Rev 759 at 767–771; Michael 
Abramowicz, “En Banc Revisited” (2000) 100 Colum L Rev 1600 at 1632–1633; 
Saul Levmore, “Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities” (2002) 3 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 87; and Stephen Gageler, “Why Write Judgments?” (2014) 
36 Syd L Rev 189 at 193–196. 
128 [2004] QB 118 at [38]. See also R v Magro [2011] QB 398 at [30]. 
129 [1991] 2 NZLR 150 at 156–157 and 168 (discussed in R v Chilton [2006] 
2 NZLR 341 at [100]). 
130 [2018] AC 61. 
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illegality in Patel v Mirza131 (“Patel”). Miller was heard by all 11 of the 
then-serving justices of the UK Supreme Court, while Patel was heard 
by nine justices. But the reason for enlargement was not precisely the 
same in each case. Miller was decided by the full court, as Baroness Hale 
of Richmond later explained, so that no one could say that the result 
would have differed had the panel been different.132 Lord Neuberger put 
it more broadly although with a similar sentiment: the intense public 
interest in Miller meant that a full judicial panel was important to ensure 
public confidence in the legitimacy of the decision, particularly in the 
event of a close decision.133 Patel, however, involved nowhere the same 
degree of public exposure. This was more lawyers’ law: the nine-
member panel was specially constituted to definitively lay down the 
modern rules on illegality in contract law and to give the quietus to 
arguments based on divergent lines of authority.134 Indeed this was 
presaged by Lord Neuberger, who in Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir (No 2)135 had 
suggested that a panel of nine should soon undertake consideration of 
the proper approach to the illegality defence. 
51 Clearly, therefore, leading members of the senior judiciary view 
the number of heads involved to be linked to the legitimacy or authority 
of a decision. One cannot ignore palpable sense when Lady Hale says 
that the greater the number of judges who agree upon a decision, the 
greater authority it lends to the decision,136 although because she does 
                                                          
131 [2017] AC 467. 
132 Baroness Hale of Richmond, “Judges, Power and Accountability: Constitutional 
Implications of Judicial Selection”, speech at Constitutional Law Summer School, 
Belfast (11 August 2017). She had earlier expressed similar thoughts on the risk of 
differing outcomes from judicial panels in Brenda Hale, “A Supreme Court for the 
United Kingdom?” (2004) 24 LS 36 at 41. And from his perspective, Lord Walker 
(who did not sit on the Miller court) would possibly have agreed with this: 
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, “Moving In and Moving On – One Justice’s View” 
(2011) 7(2) Cambridge Student Law Review 1 at 2. 
133 Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, “Twenty Years a Judge: Reflections and 
Refractions” Neill Lecture 2017, Oxford (10 February 2017) at para 31. 
134 Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467 (“Patel”) at [164]. Lady Hale subsequently confirmed 
that the nonet was convened in Patel to try and resolve the differences of judicial 
opinion on the scope and rationale of the illegality defence: Baroness Hale of 
Richmond, “Legislation or Judicial Law Reform: Where Should Judges Fear to 
Tread?”, speech at the Society of Legal Scholars Conference 2016, Oxford 
(7 September 2016). 
135 [2016] AC 1 at [15]. Another challenge appears to be in store for a nine-member 
court, this time to rule on the possible shift to proportionality as the basis for 
judicial review: R (Keyu) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2016] AC 1355 at [132]; R (Youssef) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2016] AC 1457 at [55]. 
136 Baroness Hale of Richmond, “Appointments to the Supreme Court”, speech at the 
Conference to Mark the Tenth Anniversary of the Judicial Appointments 
Commission, Birmingham (6 November 2015); Baroness Hale of Richmond, 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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not go on to elaborate why size should matter in a non-elected body 
charged to boot with checking majoritarian impulses, for present 
purposes the author considers more insightful the formulation of Lord 
Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, who thought it perhaps self-evident that a 
decision of nine was likely to be more representative of the views of the 
whole court than a decision of five.137 Another candid observer was Lord 
Rodger of Earlsferry. His view was that an appeal court which did not sit 
en banc was not really a court that could readily pursue any particular 
line in developing the law;138 and Patel is, the author ventures to suggest, 
such a modern instance of a court characterised precisely by its fuller 
representation that is trying very hard to set the tone of the law right. In 
Singapore, the same can probably be said of Ochroid and Turf Club. 
52 But once it is whispered that a decision of an enlarged panel 
may take on added weight and consequences not associated with the 
ruling of a smaller division, the difficulty that floats up is how to decide 
on the number of judges to hear particular cases. (It is not proposed to 
touch on the identity of the judges chosen to sit, which raises additional 
considerations.)139 Claims of arbitrariness or unfairness can be levelled 
against the decision to assign one case but not another to be heard by a 
specially expanded court, since the larger court might feel at greater 
liberty to steer the law away from its existing course, or if some judicial 
convention is observed that only an enlarged panel may overrule 
another enlarged panel’s decision. The actual result can therefore end up 
at the mercy of the listing procedure. Andrew Burrows additionally cites 
a possible lack of transparency and consistency.140 These are serious 
charges which if left unaddressed would lead to a perception of justice as 
a series of adventitious and unprincipled endeavours, and, in my 
opinion, it rather misses the point if debate were simply to turn to 
whether an apex tribunal might or should treat as reviewable allegations 
                                                                                                                               
“Should the Law Lords Have Left the House of Lords?” Michael Ryle Lecture 2018, 
London (14 November 2018). 
137 Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, “The Supreme Court – One Year On” Bracton 
Law Lecture, Exeter (11 November 2010) at para 31. 
138 Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, “What Are Appeal Courts For?” (2004) 10 Otago 
L Rev 517 at 524. See also Alec Samuels, “The House of Lords In Banc” (1991) 
10 CJQ 6. 
139 As Alan Paterson concludes in a significant study, the composition of any given 
panel is important not simply because of the outlook of the individual members of 
the panel but also because of their approach to collective decision-making, mutual 
persuasion, group interaction and tactical calculations: Alan Paterson, Final 
Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart Publishing, 2013) 
at p 207. 
140 Andrew Burrows, “Numbers Sitting in the Supreme Court” (2013) 129 LQR 305 
at 309. 
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made against its own listing procedure.141 With the erosion of public 
confidence in the Judiciary disappears the ultimate basis of its authority 
and legitimacy. 
53 Timeous assurances would therefore be valuable from the senior 
judiciary that it follows fixed and transparent criteria when determining 
the size of the panel – for instance, the UK Supreme Court, the High 
Court of Australia and the New Zealand Court of Appeal each publishes 
its criteria online – and that there is no question at all of any packing of 
the court, assurances hopefully accompanied by a current and accessible 
elucidation of this aspect of the judicial process.142 Where overruling is 
in issue it is suggested that the ordinary practice in Singapore should be 
for the decision of a larger-than-normal panel of the apex tribunal to be 
departed from only by a panel of equal or greater size. At least two other 
measures might then be instituted to allay the concerns identified above. 
54 First, litigants in Singapore are already required to state in a 
court form whether they are asking for reconsideration of a previous 
Court of Appeal decision.143 It should now be modified to also ask 
litigants to indicate whether that decision was one made by an expanded 
panel. This particularisation will facilitate the listing of the matter before 
an appropriately constituted court, and a further practice direction 
could be issued in this regard with any other necessary emendations to 
the rules or guidelines. 
55 Secondly, if a smaller division is already sitting but any litigant 
or judge indicates during the hearing that a previous decision of an 
enlarged panel may have to be revisited, it should then be necessary for 
the court to consider ex proprio motu (perhaps over a whispered 
conference or during a momentary adjournment) whether it would be 
                                                          
141 It may be noted that Sir Richard Buxton, writing extra-judicially, thought listing 
decisions of this sort to be unreviewable, with a contrary position threatening a 
state “as anarchic as it would be unedifying”: Richard Buxton, “Sitting En Banc in 
the New Supreme Court” (2009) 125 LQR 288 at 291–293. Contrast this perhaps 
with the listing of appeals in the High Court, for which (possibly due to that court’s 
position) a stronger argument could be made ought to be reviewable by the Court 
of Appeal: cf Maxwell v Keun [1928] 1 KB 645. 
142 Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, “Tweaking the Curial Veil” The Blackstone 
Lecture 2014, Oxford (15 November 2014) at paras 46–54; Lord Neuberger of 
Abbotsbury, “The Role of the Supreme Court Seven Years On – Lessons Learnt” 
Bar Council Law Reform Lecture 2016, London (21 November 2016) at para 24. 
143 In the Appeals Information Sheet to be completed by the parties, one of the 
instructions is to “specify the critical questions of law on appeal, including but not 
limited to any questions of law which may give rise to substantial consideration 
and/or potential distinguishing/overruling of existing precedent cases”: Supreme 
Court Practice Directions (updated 15 March 2019) Form 27; Singapore 
International Commercial Court Practice Directions (updated 15 March 2019) 
Form 18. 
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convenient to have the case reargued before a fuller bench, weighing 
relevant factors such as the benefit of having more judges determine the 
issue at hand, the possibility of prejudice or a denial of justice to the 
parties owing to the delay (for instance, where there is urgent need for 
interlocutory relief or if a final decision is required in respect of an 
offender facing criminal punishment on a fast-approaching date)144 and 
any other legitimate and practical concerns concomitant with the 
adjournment of the case (including those over increased usage of 
judicial resources and legal costs). Before the court announces its 
decision in this regard, the parties should also be offered an opportunity 
for reply. Whether certain categories of disputes like those raising a 
point of constitutional significance should presumptively be heard by a 
jumbo court is more debatable145 – as mentioned earlier, Australia is an 
example where a special place seems to have been accorded to 
constitutional cases – but what is clear is that each jurisdiction must 
account for its own circumstances. Throughout all this it should be kept 
in view that the foregoing, whilst conceivably representing a suitable 
judicial practice, is no totem invariable and may be departed from in 
exceptional circumstances. To flexibly carry out justice in an appropriate 
case, a smaller division of the apex tribunal has to remain able and 
possessed of the power not to follow its prior decisions, even those 
handed down by a specially enlarged court. As one anonymous justice of 
the UK Supreme Court pointed out, the fact that that court had not felt 
it necessary to sit in a specially expanded panel should not be taken to 
mean that it had already resolved not to depart from an earlier 
decision.146 
C. Some questions 
56 Like any other fresh development the configuration of a five-
judge Court of Appeal in Singapore will throw up the odd question or 
two over its operation. For example, if the second suggestion above is 
followed then an antecedent issue will be over the propriety of even 
allowing a case to be reargued before a larger panel of judges. As an 
illustration, could the court list a case for hearing before two or three 
judges and, upon discovering the presence of a very complicated issue 
after argument had commenced, adjourn the case to be heard by a 
bench of five or other greater number? Now the power to adjourn is said 
                                                          
144 In re Yates’ Settlement Trusts [1954] 1 WLR 564. 
145 See, for instance, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, “The Role of the Supreme Court 
Seven Years On – Lessons Learnt” Bar Council Law Reform Lecture 2016, London 
(21 November 2016) at para 28. 
146 “How Much Has Changed? And What Might Change in the Years Ahead?” 
Supreme Court of the UK: Fifth Anniversary Seminar, London (1 October 2014) 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/fifth-anniversary-seminar.pdf (accessed March 
2019). 
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to be inherent in every court.147 The possibility does not appear to be 
excluded by the hodgepodge of legislation in Singapore.148 Perchance it 
may be a matter of curial practice; late convocations of an enlarged 
panel have previously occurred in Singapore and for many years in the 
UK and other Commonwealth jurisdictions.149 Indeed, that the court 
may in fact decline the parties’ invitation to adjourn the case for this 
reason points to it being the master of its own procedure,150 recognising 
of course that the discretion to adjourn should ultimately be exercised in 
accordance with legal principles and upon relevant and not irrelevant or 
extraneous considerations.151 
                                                          
147 R v Southampton Justices (1907) 96 LT 697 at 700; Hinckley and South 
Leicestershire Permanent Benefit Building Society v Freeman [1941] Ch 32 at 38–39; 
Fussell v Licensing Committee of the Justices of Somerset [1947] KB 276 at 279; R v 
Cox [1960] VR 665 at 667. 
148 See nn 8–9 above for the relevant legislation. The powers conferred on the 
Singapore Court of Appeal appear wide enough to contemplate an order for 
adjournment being made in appropriate cases; see ss 390(2), 390(3)(b) and 397(5) 
of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) and O 57 r 13(3) of the 
Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed). 
149 In Singapore, see Mok Swee Kok v Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 134. In 
New Zealand, see, for instance, Mitchell v Jones (1905) 24 NZLR 932; Collector of 
Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd [1986] 1 NZLR 404; Rawlinson v Rice [1997] 
2 NZLR 651. In Malaysia, see, for instance, Public Prosecutor v Sihabduin bin Haji 
Salleh [1980] 2 MLJ 273. In the UK, see, for instance, Saunders v Richardson (1881) 
7 QBD 388; R v Cox and Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153; R v Dennis [1894] 2 QB 458; 
Bradford v Dawson [1897] 1 QB 307; Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1; Kruse v Johnson 
[1898] 2 QB 91; R v Stoddart (1909) 2 Cr App R 217; R v Ellis [1910] 2 KB 746; R v 
Machardy [1911] 2 KB 1144; R v Hudson [1912] 2 KB 464; Hunt v Richardson 
[1916] 2 KB 446; Oaten v Auty [1919] 2 KB 278; R v Norman [1924] 2 KB 315; R v 
Chapman [1931] 2 KB 606; King v King [1943] P 91; R v Turner [1944] KB 463; 
Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718; Bracegirdle v Oxley [1947] 
1 KB 349; R v Clucas [1949] 2 KB 226; Younghusband v Luftig [1949] 2 KB 354; 
Wrottesley v Regent Street Florida Restaurant [1951] 2 KB 277; R v Whybrow (1951) 
35 Cr App R 141; Simpson v Peat [1952] 2 QB 24; Berkeley v Papadoyannis [1954] 
2 QB 149; Morelle Ltd v Wakeling [1955] 2 QB 379; R v Vickers [1957] 2 QB 664; 
R v Hopkins (1957) 41 Cr App R 231; R v Matheson [1958] 1 WLR 474; R v Evans 
[1959] 1 WLR 26; R v Green [1959] 2 QB 127; R v McVitie [1960] 2 QB 483; 
Gelberg v Miller [1961] 1 WLR 153; R v Patterson [1962] 2 QB 429; R v Evans 
[1963] 1 QB 979; Ward v James [1966] 1 QB 273; R v Anderson [1966] 2 QB 110; 
R v Assim [1966] 2 QB 249; R v Newsome [1970] 2 QB 711; R v Locker [1971] 
2 QB 321; Jones v Secretary of State for Social Services [1972] AC 944; R v Lillis 
[1972] 2 QB 236; R v Breeze [1973] 1 WLR 994; R v Medway [1976] 1 QB 779; R v 
Groom [1977] 1 QB 6; R v Weeder (1980) 71 Cr App R 228; Pepper v Hart [1993] 
AC 593; Boyce v The Queen [2005] 1 AC 400; In re Trinity Mirror plc [2008] 
QB 770; R v T [2010] 1 WLR 2655; R v Waya [2013] 1 AC 294; International 
Energy Group Ltd v Zurich Insurance plc UK Branch [2016] AC 509; R v Kahar 
[2016] 1 WLR 3156. 
150 R v Redbourne [1992] 1 WLR 1182; R v Finch (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 226. 
151 Matheson v Matheson [1952] VLR 27 at 30; In re Yates’ Settlement Trusts [1954] 
1 WLR 564; Lee v Saint [1958] VR 126 at 129–131. 
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57 One technical argument against allowing any such adjournment 
is that, once seised of the appeal, a duly constituted court of two or three 
judges has an unavoidable positive duty to either uphold or overturn the 
lower decision, following a line of authority in R v Bridgend Justices,152 
R v Bromley Justices153 and R v Redbridge Justices.154 (The respondent is 
perhaps more likely to raise such an argument, in an attempt to turn any 
judicial indecision into a dismissal of the appeal in its favour.) Notably, 
however, the tribunals involved in these cases were all subject to 
different legislation governing their powers and obligations; the cases 
can therefore be distinguished. More significant is the authority of R v 
Shama155 (“Shama”), where an objection was taken that the 
reconstituted court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The argument 
is not fully captured (because it was not ultimately required to be 
resolved) but a verbal exchange recorded in the Criminal Appeal 
Reports hints at the content of the objection. The appellant, it seems, 
had thought “there was a jurisdiction issue so far as Archbold dealt with 
the matter”.156 Upon investigation, however, we see that Archbold’s 
chapter entitled “Criminal Appeal” mentions nowhere the occasional 
practice of the court reconstituting itself after the initial hearing.157 One 
is left to surmise whence the appellant got the inspiration for the 
demurral. The tenuous possibilities are the chapter’s coverage of cases 
where it is stated that the CACD (being a creature of statute) did not 
have any inherent jurisdiction, and, separately, its citation of s 55(5) of 
the Supreme Court Act 1981 (now the Senior Courts Act 1981)158 
declaring that: 
… [w]here an appeal has been heard by a court consisting of an even 
number of judges and the members of the court are equally divided, 
the case shall be re-argued before and determined by an uneven 
number of judges not less than three. 
Now the former should not reasonably found an objection to a court 
reconstituting itself if it were already properly seised of jurisdiction and 
not functus officio after the initial hearing. And the latter is concerned 
with a quite different scenario of a court comprising an even number of 
judges that is split down the middle; it does not say that that is the only 
situation in which a court may adjourn the case for hearing before a 
                                                          
152 [1975] Crim LR 287. 
153 [1984] Crim LR 235. 
154 [1992] QB 384. 
155 [1990] 1 WLR 661; (1990) 91 Cr App R 138. 
156 (1990) 91 Cr App R 138 at 140. 
157 Archbold: Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases (Stephen Mitchell & 
P J Richardson eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 42nd Ed, 1985) ch 7; Archbold: Pleading, 
Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases (Stephen Mitchell, P J Richardson & 
D A Thomas eds) (Sweet & Maxwell, 43rd Ed, 1988; First Supplement 1988) ch 7. 
158 c 54. 
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larger panel. On a fair examination Shama ought hardly to constitute a 
negative authority on the court’s discretion to adjourn. The practice 
itself has not attracted criticism in the leading commentaries.159 
58 The final point discussed in these pages pertains to the selection 
method of the judges to sit on expanded panels of the Singapore Court 
of Appeal. It is an important procedural matter which can tangibly affect 
the quality of justice dispensed, and two models are particularly ripe for 
consideration: one where the additional judges are by default drawn 
from the existing complement of permanent members, and the other 
where they are more readily enlisted from elsewhere, such as puisne 
judges or judges on senior status. In brief, the first offers stability in that 
smaller divisions of the court are less likely to rule differently in future 
cases and there can be a settled expectation as to prevailing judicial 
attitudes (realistically, this advances the certainty of advice given to 
laypersons); on the other hand, drawing solely from the permanent wells 
can (particularly where there is a practice of persistent dissent) lead to 
judges taking unpersuadable legal positions – this will depend on the 
individual personalities involved – and also the court’s ability to tap on 
specialist expertise located elsewhere is reduced. This last factor is of 
course the major advantage of the second model, with an ancillary 
benefit being the increased capacity of the court to hear more cases, but 
some will point out the optical drawback of non-permanent judges 
sitting on an expanded panel of the final appellate court and having a 
significant (and possibly outsized) influence on the development of the 
law, which should be the rare preserve of judges permanently appointed 
to that court. Further, in isolated cases there may arise real or perceived 
risks to the independence of puisne judges who are up for promotion to 
the appellate bench. 
59 The first model is observed by the High Court of Australia, 
whereas the UK Supreme Court draws relatively more often on the 
experience of judges who do not usually sit on that court. Current 
evidence, presented above,160 shows Singapore adopting a practical and 
fairly flexible stance on this issue. For five-judge panels of the Court of 
Appeal the normal practice is that only the permanent members will 
sit – this is possibly aimed at the sound development of an influential 
jurisprudence and the reduction of the risk of smaller divisions taking 
on conflicting reasoning in the future – while non-permanent judges 
may be asked to participate more frequently on three-member panels as 
                                                          
159 See, for instance, Taylor on Criminal Appeals (Paul Taylor ed) (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd Ed, 2012) at paras 5.08 and 11.74; Susan Holdham & Alix Beldam, Court 
of Appeal Criminal Division: A Practitioner’s Guide (Sweet & Maxwell, 1st Ed, 
2012) at para 2-009; Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2018 
(P J Richardson ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2017) at para 7-30. 
160 See para 20 above. 
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one aspect of the court’s exercise in efficient caseload management (it 
was mentioned earlier how Menon CJ had previously indicated that 
Chao Hick Tin SJ (who recently took senior status) and three other 
senior High Court judges would increasingly be hearing more Court of 
Appeal cases). If the foregoing accurately summarises the existing 
practice then one can only add that there is no necessary inconsistency 
in this selection of judges. Each jurisdiction must chart its own course 
and this extends to the practice of the courts; what is more vital is to 
identify and evaluate its rationale and consequences, and then to 
constantly see if the practice keeps up with the changing circumstances. 
On this standard there is, as has been suggested here, sufficient 
justification for the current procedure taken by the Singapore Court of 
Appeal. 
V. Conclusion 
60 Studying the business of our top courts has not always been 
easy. Initially there were the alleged concerns over secrecy. The hole in 
public knowledge of what went on behind the velour was to some extent 
filled when outsiders were able to start collecting more empirical 
information about courts in a bid to “gaze inwards” using indirect data 
proxies. But today many courts have shed the older attitudes and readily 
disclose – indeed are proud of – their performance indicators in their 
annual reports. Top judicial administrators regularly give speeches on 
various aspects of decision-making.161 More and more they see the 
discussion of better judicial procedures and processes as encompassing 
not just dialogues between all the stakeholders involved but also 
conversations between judiciaries in different countries. Existing 
practices are shared with openness; improvements are suggested with 
candour; changes are made with humility. 
61 The practice of constituting an enlarged court to hear 
appropriate cases provides a good illustration. In the old days such 
listing decisions would probably have been viewed purely as a matter of 
internal court administration, and an inquiry into the considerations 
behind those decisions might have been met with a polite but firm 
rebuff. Within the last two decades, however, the expanded panel has for 
the reasons adumbrated earlier found increasing modern utility, and this 
has also meant that some thought has had to be given to the intelligible 
distinguishment of cases which warrant the additional judges and those 
                                                          
161 For example, as Lord Hodge has observed extra-judicially of the UK, senior judges 
there have in recent years given public lectures to explain the justice system in a 
way which was forbidden 60 years ago: Lord Hodge, “Preserving Judicial 
Independence in an Age of Populism”, speech at the North Strathclyde Sheriffdom 
Conference, Paisley (23 November 2018) at para 24. 
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which do not. With increasing openness more of these differentiating 
criteria have become public knowledge, so that there is clarity, 
accountability and transparency of that component of the process. 
62 In Australia, New Zealand and the UK the senior courts have 
issued for themselves what seem to be rather comparable criteria, 
although New Zealand has probably the narrowest position expressed. 
As has been discussed, Singapore has struck a similar balance on the 
core criteria, and yet there are two things that stand out in particular in 
an evaluation of how the practice has functioned so far. Where a fuller 
court is convened it has more often been staffed by all of the permanent 
members of the Court of Appeal; and the lack of any obvious increase in 
dissents or concurrences emanating from five-judge panels tends to 
indicate that the expansionary practice has not, on that measure, 
affected the working collegiality in that court. The signs are that it will 
continue to operate in Singapore for its perceived benefits, but if an 
appropriate opportunity should arise then it is hoped that the next step 
may be taken to elaborate further on the types of cases which justify 
determination by an enlarged court, and, in related vein, to clarify the 
status of the decisions made by such a court. 
 
